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Dear Editor,
Delusions are the hallmark of psychotic disorders1. For many years, 
they guided the diagnostic of schizophrenia after their inclusion 
into the first-rank set of symptoms of schizophrenia2. However, the 
special treatment given to Schneider’s symptoms in the DSM and ICD 
systems has been highly questioned over the last years3,4. They have 
been shown not to be exclusive to schizophrenia, and their reliability 
in distinguishing bizarre from non-bizarre delusions has been found 
poor5,6. Schneider’s symptoms have been identified in patients 
with neurotic disorders7, manic-depressive disorders8, and mood 
disorders. Peralta and Cuesta9 concluded that Schneider’s symptoms 
were highly prevalent in most forms of psychotic disorders. In light 
of this situation, the DSM-V10 has eliminated the special treatment 
of Schneiderian symptoms, and with it, the special treatment of 
delusions as a key diagnostic input. Apart from the elimination of 
the subtypes of schizophrenia, the DSM-V proposes: ‘the elimination 
of the special attribution of bizarre delusions and Schneiderian first-
rank auditory hallucinations (e.g., two or more voices conversing)’11. 
This decision has two main consequences within a diagnostic context. 
First, it means that delusions will be treated like any other symptom 
in terms of diagnostic relevance4. Second, it makes really obscure 
the exact diagnostic role of delusions within the DSM system, as it 
is not clear what they would be a symptom of.
There are good reasons to think that, at least, the elimination of 
the special treatment of delusions is not the best way to deal with 
the lack of discriminability of Schneiderian symptoms. Delusions 
involve a number of experiential12, affective13,14, and cognitive12,15 
alterations that do not seem to be present in such high rates in 
other symptoms. In addition, the adoption of psychotic delusions 
occurs within a context in which the whole experience of the subject 
and the world is rarefied1,16,17. Although delusions are not exclusive 
to schizophrenia; they still are a fundamental sign of profound 
breakdowns within the patients’ mind, breakdowns that might 
distinguish them from other relevant symptoms. In consequence, I 
think delusions should not be treated equally to other symptoms that 
do not involve all the abnormalities they do. Here it is important to 
note that not even all delusions should be treated equally. Delusions 
vary considerably in content and phenomenological features. Some 
of them are bizarre and some of them are accidentally possible12,15. 
Some delusions involve the presence of weird ideas about the world 
(I’ve been followed; people are constantly looking at me’), while others 
involve the distortion of ego-boundaries (‘thoughts are inserted 
into my mind’ – Thought Insertion), and even the disintegration 
of one’s own feeling of being alive (‘I’m dead’ – Cotard Delusion). 
All these differences in content and phenomenological features are 
determined by different aetiological routes. This is not something that 
should be ignored when weighing the diagnostic role of delusions. 
Differences in the type of abnormalities and doxastic contents they 
involve make delusions worthy of a more specific treatment within 
clinical diagnosis. The open problem challenge is to define such a 
treatment in a conceptually clear and empirically well-informed 
way. It follows that the clarification and serious consideration of 
the aetiological, content-related, and phenomenological differences 
between delusions might help to clarify their diagnostic role. Let’s 
hope the next version of the DSM system incorporates these issues 
in order to offer a better and clearer view on the particular role of 
delusions in clinical diagnosis.
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